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There is more to economic activity than just a bright side and a dark side. There 
are  other  ways  of  thinking,  other  ways  of  choosing  among  strategies,  other 
rationalities, other ethics and other institutional systems. I will propose in this 
paper to arrange these systems into four layers: Caves, Temples, Palaces and 
Bazaars.  I  believe  this  classification  will  allow  us  to  better  understand  some 
apparently irrational behavior and the way we interact with each other. 
 
Previous warning 
Although  different  among  themselves,  all  four  systems  analyzed  below  are 
imbedded in each individual of our society. All of us have the power to think and 
behave  under  the  directions  of  any  of  them,  but  there  will  always  be  one 
rationality  prevailing  over  the  other  three.  Similarly,  social  groups  can  also 
posses all four systems, and can also be identified with one of them –dominant 
over the others- that they will claim as theirs. Most times the boundaries are 
blurred. 
 
In this paper I will seek delimitating, classifying and assigning institutions to one 
or another system, but the nature of that assignation can only be understood 
within a global approach. I will propose for instance a direct link between family 
and delinquency that could be  shocking.  I will also identify communism as a 
religion. Only a global view of the ideas analyzed here will help us to interpret 
those links and to better understand behaviors such as the role of “godfathers” 
in mafias and of revolutionary martyrs like “Che” Guevara.  
Each  of  the  four  systems  has  its  own  historical  origin:  they  all  appeared, 
evolved and consolidated at a specific time of human history, in an environment 
where  those  rationalities  provided  a  higher  survival  value.  Nowadays  these 
systems survive and adapt to different environments. Nevertheless, despite the 
adaptations, they pretty much maintain their basic original features and internal 
logic. This is what I will explain below. 
 
Choosing is difficult 
 
Any definition of economic science makes explicit or implicit reference to the 
problem of choosing among alternatives. Economy can be seen as a rationality 
system,  a  method  for  adopting  decisions  and  choosing  among  alternatives. 
Rationality is about choosing “the best”. Economic rationality is about choosing 
the “most valuable”. Any rationality system is eventually a method for assigning 
values to things when we have incomplete information, a method of ranking the 
alternatives that we have. We, the economic imperialists –invaders, like Jack 
Hirshleifer, of the territories of other social sciences- may agree that any form of 
rationality -any way of choosing among alternatives- is Economics. 
 
The boundaries of rationality have been studied recently from diverse points of 
view.  I  hope  you  will  excuse  me  for  using  as  an  example  a  problem  that  I 
studied jointly with J.H. a few years ago. 
 
In  conflicts  we  must  normally  choose between  a  “hard” strategy and a “soft” 
strategy. In environments modeled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma we must choose 
between  Defect  or  Cooperate  strategies.  In  environments  modeled  by  the 
Chicken Dilemma we must choose between Hawk and Dove strategies.  
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma  Chicken Dilemma 
  Soft  Hard    Soft  Hard 
Soft  2,2  4,1  Soft  2,2  3,1 
Hard  1,4  3,3 
 
Hard  1,3  4,4 
 It  is  very  clear  in  both  kinds  of  conflict  which  is  the  best  choice  when  the 
opponent’s  strategy  is  Soft:  it  will  always  be  better  for  us  to  play  Hard.  The 
problem arises when the opponent’s strategy is Hard. In this case, under the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma the worst option is to play Soft. Under the Chicken Dilemma 
however, the worst option is to play Hard  when  the  opponent plays Hard as 
well. 
 
When these dilemmas are repeated along time with the same players, we can 
adopt reactive strategies that take previous opponent’s behavior into account. 
Although, as Axelrod concluded, in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma the best 
option  is  Tit  For  Tat,  in  the  repeated  Chicken’s  Dilemma,  the  best  option  is 
Bully. 
 
In real world dilemmas however, we will not always be able to tell a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma  from  a  Chicken’s  Dilemma.  The  fact  that  payments  are  based  on 
uncertain estimations prevent us from being able to rank the third and fourth 
positions -which are actually the only difference between both dilemmas. 
 
Anyway, both the Prisoner’s and the Chicken’s Dilemmas are non-cooperative 
games,  with  non-transferable  utility  and  no  possibility  of  communication 
between players. They are both about a confrontation “against others”. But both 
dilemmas  will  vanish  in  conflicts  “among  ourselves”.  We  can  talk  and  reach 
agreements. We can share payments. We will always choose the soft strategy 
when conflict arises “among ourselves”.  
 
But who are we? This is a different problem. The members of our family? We, 
the Zoroastrians? We, the subjects of the Babylonian Empire? We, the agents 
buying and selling in a global free market? 
 
To choose among Soft and Hard strategies it is necessary to know who we are 
and  make  our  social  identity  clear.  But  social  identity  has  always  been  a 
problem  overlooked  by  economists,  as  it  has  been  a  field  occupied  by 
sociologists and psychologists. Some of them have done a very good job. And, as J.H. said, when social scientists do a good job, they are doing Economics.  
Following J.H.’s banner, we will now courageously invade their territory. 
 
Caves, Temples, Palaces and Bazaars as social identities 
 
  Cave  Temple  Palace  Bazaar 
Who we are vs. 
They  Family.  
Religious group.  
Those with the 
same god. 
Political group. 




something to sell. 
Ethics: Being 
“hard” to “They” 
is justified 
Simple: doubts 






Defined by law. 
Precisely 
measured by 
estimation of costs 
and benefits. 







(rules)  Instincts  Traditions  Written laws  Weights and 
measures 
Cultural 
complexity  Illiteracy  Oral traditions  Literacy  Mathematical 
Largest group 
during  Paleolithic  Neolithic  Historical times 
(scriptural)  Monetary times 
 
 
I will use here the word ‘Cave’ when referring to the ethics, the rationality and 
the institutions associated with the family. We, those who live in the same cave, 
are linked by blood. We will always keep Soft behaviors and strategies and will 
share our property. We will distrust others. Therefore, when involved in conflicts 
with outsiders, we will use Hard strategies, or Bully, or at least Tit For Tat. 
 
The ‘Cave’ is the largest social group in the Paleolithic. It does not require any 
special  knowledge  to  be  a  member  of  our  family.  Although  illiterate,  we  can 
distinguish  our  parents  and  siblings  from  outsiders.  Our  instincts  indicate  us 
who should we love and who should we be afraid of, who are we and who are 
they.  Cave  rules  are  simple  and  implicit  and  do  not  require  much  wording. 




I will use here the word ‘Temple’ when referring to the ethics, the rationality and 
the institutions associated with religious and cultural groups. We, those sharing the Temple, worship the same god and practice the same rituals. We celebrate 
the  same  holidays  on  the  same  days,  singing  the  same  hymns.  Among  our 
fellow worshipers, we will always keep soft behaviors and strategies. We will 
distrust  infidels.  When  involved  in  conflicts  with  others,  we  will  use  Hard 
strategies, or Bully, or at least Tit For Tat. We will attack and destroy infidels in 
the name of god -and with the help of god.  
 
We will share part of our property and will give alms to our church so that they 
are distributed among our community. We will practice charity among ourselves 
and will look after our neighbors’ orphans and widows. 
 
There were no temples in the Paleolithic: they appeared in Neolithic times. The 
Temple  is  the  largest  and  dominant  social  group  in  the  Neolithic  up  to  the 
introduction  of  writing.  Up  until  then,  religious  rules  were  transmitted  by  oral 
tradition.  They  required  an  effort  to  memorize  chants  and  rituals.  Therefore 
traditions were kept and interpreted by priests. Rules of behavior and interaction 




I will use here the word ‘Palace’ when referring to the ethics, the rationality and 
the  institutions  associated  with  political  groupings.  We,  those  who  share  the 
Palace,  are  subject  to  the  same  law,  live  under  the  same  governments  and 
empires.  In  compliance  with  the  law  we  will  behave  among  ourselves  with 
cooperative and Soft strategies. With those who breach our laws we will play 
Hard.  We  will  invade  and  conquer  our  enemies  in  order  to  civilize  them,  to 
subdue them to our law, and will crush them if they resist. 
 
Since our law is very complex it requires to be written. The law provides the 
solutions  to  most  potential  conflicts  among  us.  A  very  complex  system  of 
lawyers, judges, policemen and executioners will develop, interpret and enforce 
the  law.  Our  property  can  be  taxed  and  confiscated  on  legal  terms  by  the 
government. In order to know the law, it is necessary to be able to read. In order 
to  be  able  to  recognize  the  members  of  our  Palace  we must know  our own history and that of our rulers –hence, we must know how to read. Consequently 
the Palace can only be built after the emergence of the written word. Up to the 
invention of money, the Palace is the largest social group that can be gathered. 
 
 
I will use here the word ‘Bazaar’ when referring to the ethics, the rationality and 
the institutions associated with the market. We, those sharing the Bazaar, are 
those who want to buy and -at the same time- have something to sell. Money as 
an  accurate  measuring  tool  –together  with  other  systems  for  measuring  and 
weighting goods- will allow us to reach agreements among ourselves. 
 
This system does not only require literacy but also some mathematical skills. 
The Bazaar can only emerge and develop after the introduction of money. In 
order for the Bazaar to expand, there must be common payment tools available, 
recognized  by  merchants  under  different  governments.  We  will  conduct 
business with anyone willing to buy or sell at an adequate price, whatever their 
family, religion or country. Property is not shared. 
 
Among  ourselves,  members  of  the  Bazaar,  we  will  cooperate  and  play  Soft 
strategies.  However,  we  can  switch  to  other  strategies  when  an  accurate 
calculation of costs and benefits so advise. We will play Hard with anyone trying 
to get our propriety without paying an agreed price. Sometimes we will also play 
Hard or Bully with those that do not want to sell what we need. 
 
 
The  Temple  includes  Caves  and  allows  solving  conflicts  among  them.  The 
Temple gathers all the families living under the same god and with the same 
cultural  traditions.  In  so  doing,  it  decreases  the  probability  of  conflict  and 
increases  the  probability of cooperation and interaction. The Temple reduces 
costs and increases profits. 
 
However,  the  rules  of  the  Temple  are  not  clear.  God’s  will,  revealed  to  our 
prophets and ancestors, is obscure and requires interpretation by priests. There is no possibility of communication with those with a different god or a different 
interpretation of his word. 
 
The Palace includes Temples. The state can subdue peoples with diverse gods 
and  cultural  traditions  under  the  same  law.  Possibilities  for  interaction  and 
making profit become even higher, and at a lower cost. 
 
The Bazaar includes Palaces. Market overcomes political boundaries globally, 





In the present times, all four rationalities described above coexist inside each of 
us. 
·  Sometimes we tend to assign values and choose among alternatives by 
paying attention only to  our basic  instincts of love, fear, envy or hate. 
This is the rationality of the Cave. 
·  Sometimes we tend to assign values and choose among alternatives by 
paying  attention  only  to  tradition  and  established  customs.  Temple’s 
rationality  encourages  us  to  imitate  others  in  our  cultural  environment 
and to behave following what our religious leaders say is the will of god.  
·  Sometimes  we  tend  to  assign  values  and  choose  among  alternatives, 
paying attention only to the law. Our behavior is dictated by the law. This 
is the rationality of the Palace. 
·  Sometimes  we  tend  to  assign  values  and  choose  among  alternatives 
paying  attention  only  to  market  laws,  by  estimating  the  costs  and 
benefits. This is the rationality of the Bazaar. 
 
The  four  rationalities  support  each  other.  The  Bazaar  requires 
acknowledgement of the law, the rationality of the Palace. The foundations of 
the Palace rest on the principles of tradition and authority of the Temple, without 
which the law could not be sustained. Finally, the Temple principles of tradition 
and authority are based on instinct, the Cave rationality.  
However,  although  based  on  each  other,  the  four  rationalities  coexist 
simultaneously  and  independently  within  all  individuals.  Given  a  set  of 
alternatives,  there  will  be  four  different  transitive  rankings:  one  based  on 
instinct, one based on tradition, one based on law and order and the last one 
based on the mathematical estimation of costs and benefits. The four rankings -
although  transitive  each  of  them-  can  be  different  and  conflictive  with  each 
other, due to their different systems for weighting costs and assigning values. 
This  is  the  reason  why  humans  frequently  hesitate  about  which  decision  to 
choose. This is the reason why social scientists find behaviors that cannot be 
explained with just one -their- rationality system. 
 
For  instance,  let’s  try  to  understand  the  behavior  of  an  individual  crashing  a 
plane against a New York tower. This behavior cannot be explained under the 
Bazaar rationality, as an estimation of costs and benefits. This behavior cannot 
be explained by the Palace rationality either, as a conduct fulfilling rules written 
by  legal  and  political  authorities.  This  behavior  cannot  be  explained  by  the 
rationality of the Cave, because instincts will tell the individual to turn the plane 
away to prevent our death and that of others. However, this behavior can be 
perfectly  understood  within  the  Temple  rationality.  Crashing  the  plane  is  a 
behavior  generously  awarded  by  god,  because  it  is  his  will,  and  the  act  will 
result in benefits -even pride- to all fellow believers. All four rationalities may 
coexist  simultaneously  inside  the  pilot’s  mind.  The  individual  is  aware  of  the 
contradictions, but nevertheless solves the problem by accepting one rationality 
as dominant over the others. 
 
  Cave  Temple  Palace  Bazaar 




Fanatics - religious 
or agnostics 
(communists). 







position rank  4  3  2  1 
 
Whenever possible, we will always try to use the rationality of the Bazaar. Only 
when this fails or cannot be used, we will resort to the Palace rationality. If both of  these  are  still  not  clear, we  will  then proceed to the Temple and  tradition 
rationality. Only when no other rationality is available, we will follow our Cave 
instincts. 
 
The Cave rationality seems to be dominant among marginal groups, outlaws 
and gangs.  Somehow criminals do not know or understand the ethics of the 
Temple, the Palace and the Bazaar. Socially marginalized people -those with 
nothing  to  sell,  illiterate  and  with  no  religious  education-  are  the  most 
susceptible to be dragged by the Cave logic, showing Hard behaviors against 
individuals outside his family. They have simple rules for internal relations, and 
inside conflicts are solved by godfathers. Although religious people, politicians 
or businessmen can also used the rationality of the Cave, for them it will not be 
the dominant rationality or common way of decision-making. 
 
The  Temple  rationality  and  ethics  seem  to  be  dominant  not  only  among 
religious groups but also among secular and atheist groups that share a wealth 
of  traditions,  symbols  and  rituals.  Let’s  see  for  example  the  “communion  of 
saints”,  a  Christian  dogma  stating  that  any  good  action  carried  out  by  one 
individual  will  have  a  positive  effect  on  each  and  every  one  of  the  other 
members  of  the  congregation.  This  dogma  is  characteristic  of  the  Temple 
rationality and is contradictory with the rationality of the Cave, the Palace or the 
Bazaar. But the rationality of the “communion of saints” explains the myth of 
“Che” Guevara, martyr and  communist fighter whose sacrifice in the Bolivian 
mountains was made for the benefit of all revolutionaries of the world. In any 
case,  the  Temple  logic  seems  to  be  dominant  mainly  among  those  that  –
although with a basic education and training- lack a broader cultural background 
and have nothing to sell. 
 
The  rationality  of  the  Palace  seems  to  be  dominant  among  politicians,  the 
military  and  bureaucrats.  Let’s  take  taxes  and  legal  expropriations  as  an 
example. These are methods of transferring wealth based on political rights and 
power relations. These are beyond the rationality of the Bazaar. Politicians, the 
military  and  bureaucrats  cannot  be  at  the  same  time  merchants  or  business people.  These  are  incompatible  occupations,  because  they  are  based  on 




The homo economicus and the Economic Theory  
 
We, economists, have always considered the existence of a unique rationality 
system able to explain all human behavior -including the instincts of hate, envy, 
philanthropy and solidarity- as an axiom of our science. In fact, the concept of 
homo  economicus  has  always  been  equivalent  to  economic  rationality.  The 
homo  economicus  is  a  description  of  the  individual’s  economical  decision 
criteria. There have been many and diverse homo economicus in the history of 
economic thought, but all of them were defined by their rationality, their way of 
ranking preferences. Each homo economicus had a unique rationality. 
 
Hayek  (The  Fatal  Conceit,  1988)  was  the  first  one  to  confront  this  idea  by 
proposing instinct behaviour as irrational and ethics as a kind of semi-rationality, 
something  “between instinct and reason”.  Here in this paper I propose to go 
further to acknowledge these four ways of assigning values to make choices as 
four different economic rationalities. 
 
We, economists, had always thought that one –unique- rationality should -and 
could- be understood and explained by our discipline. What I now propose is to 
accept  the  existence  of  different  rationalities,  contradictory  among  them.  I 
propose  to  let  any  hope  of  conciliation  among  rationalities  aside.  What  we 
actually need is a better understanding of the reasons why -and under which 
circumstances- one rationality is dominant instead of the others.  
  Cave  Temple  Palace  Bazaar 
   





















System  Natural Economy 
(Ghiselin-JH) 
Traditional 





Traditional  economics  taught  in  our  universities  –what  was  explained  in  the 
handbooks by J.B. Say, A. Marshall or P. Samuelson- is nothing more than a 
set  of  tools  designed  to  understand  the  Bazaar  rationality.  This  set  of  tools 
forms the grammar that rules and structures the Bazaar rationality. We can use 
these tools to analyze and partially understand other rationalities, but we must 
be aware that a full understanding is out of reach to the outsider. The rationality 
of each system is a close and complete system in itself. 
 
  Cave  Temple  Palace  Bazaar 
Bright side 










Dark side  Distrust, vendetta  Hate infidels. 
Religious wars.  Predatory wars.   Marginalizing 
 
All four rationalities have a bright side and a dark side. The bright side rules the 
relations  between  those  inside  the  system.  The  dark  side  is  the  behavior 
towards those outside the system. Jack Hirshleifer proposed to study the dark 
side and its macro-technology. He suggested creating a kind of Cobb-Douglas 
function for conflictive behavior, in order to explain the interactions of individuals 
of a system with outsiders, as -for instance- the struggles to obtain and protect 
property. As Jack spoke of wars, armies and Machiavelli economy, it seems 
that what he had in mind was mostly the dark side of the Palace. Jack didn’t 
make this distinction but I do believe, that to develop his proposals further, we 
must differentiate among the dark sides of Caves, Temples and Palaces.  
 
The Global Cave 
 
We, economists, have an old habit of predicting the future. Old habits die hard, 
so, to honor this tradition, I will try to describe briefly a new rationality system 
that seems to me to be emerging in our times and that one day may become 
dominant. 
  
Actually, there are signs nowadays of a new form of economic rationality. Let’s 
name it the “Global Cave”. The Bazaar puts those with nothing to sell outside 
the  system.  Palaces,  Temples  and  Caves  exclude  those  belonging  to  other 
Palaces, Temples and Caves. On the contrary, in the Global Cave there is room 
for all human beings.  
 
The  Global  Cave  may  be  the  consequence  of  the  new  information  and 
communication  technologies.  Some  individuals  receive  a  wealth  of  data  and 
knowledge  about  the  rest  of  humankind:  their  economic  necessities,  their 
political  systems,  their  culture,  even  their  genetic  identity.  Information  has 
become the main asset. Information is inexpensive to obtain, to transfer and to 
accumulate. 
 
These information-rich individuals, guided by the new Global Cave rationality, 
do not want to use Hard strategies against other member of our species. The 
Global Cave rationality accepts giving away our information, even our money 
and our time for the benefit of the less privileged, whatever their race or creed. 
When we give information away, we lose nothing and our chances of improving 
our prosperity increases. The Global Cave seems to work under the law of ever-
increasing  returns.  This  new  rationality  is  being  currently  analyzed,  among 
others, by the economy of information, the economy of free intellectual property 
(Levine & Boldrin 2002), the “networks economy”, and the economy of the “third 
–philanthropic- sector”.   
 This way of thinking can use the Bazaar rationality when looking for efficiency.  
The Global Cave is being built under the Palace law and order, and over the 
foundations of the Cave and Temple links of solidarity. 
 
However,  even  if  the  Global  Cave  eventually  turns  out  to  be  the  dominant 
rationality, the economy of the dark side would not become obsolete. I am afraid 
that  the  Palace,  Temple  and  Cave  rationalities  will  remain  dominant  for 






Boulding, K.E. The economy of love and fear: a preface to grants economics, 
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1973 
 
Hayek, F.A. The Fatal Conceit: Or the errors of socialism, 1988 
 
Hirshleifer,  J.,  "Competition,  Cooperation,  and  Conflict  in  Economics  and 
Biology," The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 1978), pp. 238-
243.  
 
Hirshleifer, J., "The Expanding Domain of Economics," The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 75, No. 6. (Dec 1985), pp. 53-68 
 
Hirshleifer,  J.,  Martinez-Coll,  J.C.,  1988.  “What  Strategies  Can  Support  the 
Evolutionary  Emergence  of  Cooperation?”  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution  32, 
367-398. 
 
Hirshleifer,  J.,  Martinez-Coll,  J.C.,  1992.  “Selection,  Mutation,  and  the 
Preservation  of  Diversity  in  Evolutionary  Games”.  Revista  Española  de 
Economia 9, 2, 251-273. 
 Hirshleifer,  J.,  2001.  The  Dark  Side  of  the  Force:  Economic  Foundations  of 
Conflict Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Levine, D.K. and M. Boldrin "The Case Against Intellectual Property," American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 92: 209-212, 2002. 
 
Martinez-Coll,  J.C.,  Hirshleifer,  J.,  1991.  “The  Limits  of  Reciprocity:  Solution 
Concepts  and  Reactive  Strategies  in  Evolutionary  Equilibrium  Models”. 
Rationality and Society 3, 35-64. 
 